Photo courtesy of Trung Nguyen

[Ed. note: This is part two of a series on Tactical Patrol.  The first article is Tactical Patrol Mindset.]

In this article I’d like to discuss a few of the most common critical incident calls where understanding the priority of life is critical to making a proper police response, especially for the initial patrol officers on scene.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

This is probably one of the most frequent calls police receive, and also one of the most dangerous. Patrol officers should understand that it is the priority of life, along with the exigency exemption to the 4th Amendment, that allows officers to force their way into a residence to investigate a domestic violence report should someone refuse their entry. The courts are saying that the “victim” is more important than any privacy rights a suspect might want to enjoy, even in his own home. Understanding the priority of life gives patrol officers the confidence to act and to act quickly to properly handle domestic violence calls, and provide assistance to victims.

If entry cannot be obtained then officers should determine the situation’s facts. Is this a hostage situation? Is this a barricade? Are there innocent lives present? Answers to these questions will determine the most appropriate response of the patrol officers on scene. If you know people are inside and not answering, perhaps the best course of action is to surround the house and call them out to you. If the suspect refuses to exit, then perhaps a breach & hold (kicking in the door, but waiting outside the threshold) could be attempted. However, absent evidence of an assault in progress, treat it as a barricade and perform the “Four C’s” of patrol response to critical incidents (contain, control, communicate, call SWAT). Remember though, just because SWAT is called does not alleviate patrol’s responsibility to have an immediate action plan to enter and save hostages should that contingency occur.

If the victim meets you at the door and there are no innocents in the house, officers shouldn’t feel compelled to walk right into the residence to contact the suspect. How about calling the suspect to you where you can be in a position of advantage instead of walking into his.

If there are innocents in the house (children, other family, neighbors, etc.) patrol should try to separate the victim and suspect as quickly as possible. If the suspect has fled to a deep part of the residence then have the victim and innocents leave the danger area, and when they are secure, attempt to call-out the suspect. During this time an arrest team should be ready in case the suspect decides to exit.

BARRICADED SUBJECTS (SUICIDAL)

This is probably the most misinterpreted and mishandled call that police respond to today. However, if you use the priorities of life scale, the understanding of how to properly handle these calls should be more clear.

The first consideration should be to determine if any innocent people are close to the suicidal subject. If yes, than we must act to deprive the suicidal subject the opportunity to turn those people into hostages, or victims. If the answer is no, then we have to determine if the person is in a capacity to endanger innocents.

If the suicidal is armed in a public place we have to do something, which is the protection of innocents. This does not mean we rush the subject or expose ourselves needlessly to danger, violating the priority of life scale. Officers who approach suicidal subjects unnecessarily, were threatened and as a result killed the suspect, have been found civilly liable for “creating” a deadly force situation. Instead, we need to contain them and use less lethal intervention as quickly as possible.

However, if the suicidal is alone at home we need to completely re-evaluate our response tactics. What happens if the suicidal subject refuses to come outside? Should we force entry because they’re threatening suicide? Should we make this a prolonged “barricaded” subject call? I think the answer is no to both questions, and the National Tactical Officer’s Association (N.T.O.A.) seems to support that idea.

The reasoning goes back to the priorities of life scale. Being alone in his house, the suicidal poses only a threat to himself. I understand that “suicidal = homicidal” but in this particular situation the subject is in their own home and not posing a risk to anyone other than themselves. That’s the key to our decision making. A homicidal person poses a risk to the innocents living around them so our tactics have to protect the innocents by removing the threat.

Recent court decisions look unfavorably on police when they burst into the homes of suicidal subjects to “save” them and end up killing them instead. If the subject commits suicide than they made that choice in the privacy of their own home. Perhaps a call from a C.I.T. officer, or a local mental health provider would be appropriate, but a full-scale S.W.A.T. operation will probably only end badly for the police. If “negotiations” fail, notify neighbors to call if something changes and have mental health personnel continue attempts at phone follow-up.

Leaving may seem impossible, but the 4th Amendment is the 4th Amendment. Any breaching or entry tactic is going to be seen as an escalation of the danger created by the police, which may result in an unconstitutional seizure by the police. Handling it like a barricade may result in a successful outcome, but how many extended suicidal barricades can your agency afford to conduct.

BARRICADED SUBJECT (CRIMINAL)

This type of incident really bring into focus the priority of life scale. If there are hostages or innocents in the residence, then our response is dictated by those facts. In a hostage situation information should be gathered to determine if there is an immediate threat to the hostage. If the answer is yes, then an immediate action plan should be executed including distractions, gas, and perhaps multiple entry points. All of this should be committed with the singular goal of getting to the hostage as quickly as possible to ensure their safety. Obviously one of the ways to ensure this goal is to eliminate the hostage taker if immediate compliance is not gained.

If there are innocents inside that are not hostages then we need to begin procedures to surround, contain and call-out. This is the more frequent case as we go to serve a search or arrest warrant and the wanted party refuses to come out. We need to separate the innocents from the suspect, and then evaluate our options.

I just attended the S.W.A.T. Team Leader course offered by the N.T.O.A. Several scenarios were debriefed where officers forgot the priorities of life scale and went in on a criminal barricaded subject. Officers were killed or injured. We have other tactics to resolve those situations safely – gas, gas, and more gas into the house.

Back in 2003 my S.W.A.T. team responded to assist a neighboring agency on a barricaded suspect that had engaged officers and firefighters in a gunfight. The Vietnam-vet had a history of mental illness. He lived with his 80-year old mother, and apparently got mad at her and stabbed her on the neck and arms. When she left to call for help the first officers and firefighters came under rifle fire from the house almost immediately. Having one of the first Lenco Bear Cat’s delivered to police, we responded and began evacuating the pinned-down patrol officers, firefighters and then neighbors. Eventually we saturated the house with gas and the suspect committed suicide. Before that happened about 150-200 rounds had been fired at responders. This guy had a plan and knew his tactics because our snipers never saw him in the house. When we were relatively certain the suspect was dead we still didn’t rush in. We used the Bear Cat as a battering ram. We pushed a car through and out the back of the garage to open up an exterior wall of the house and allow our E.O.D. unit to send in a robot. Only after the robot found the suspect laying in a bathtub did an Entry Team enter and confirm he was dead. Had we conducted a “dynamic” entry while the suspect was alive I’m quite sure that one or more of my teammates would have been wounded or killed.

The concept of “dynamic entry” was around in the beginning of S.W.A.T. The concept was that if S.W.A.T. entered a house with surprise (usually early morning) and diversion (flash bangs) that they could rush through the house and seize everyone before they could catch up in their O.O.D.A. cycle and respond. I’ve been a part of dozens of raids that conformed to this flawed ideology. Sadly, it has taken multiple failed attempts at dynamic entry for the police community to realize that there are better tactics to accomplish the same goal.

Much of what drove that push to rush was the desire to save evidence from destruction. Are you kidding me? Property and evidence are even lower on the priority of life list than the suspect! In essence the law enforcement community (especially S.W.A.T.) was placing the need for evidence or seizing the suspect, above the need to protect officers. For nearly 15 years now the N.T.O.A. has NOT endorsed a dynamic entry method except for hostage-rescue or active shooter situations where there are hostages or innocents in harm’s way.

HOSTAGE-TAKER/ACTIVE SHOOTER

By now the law enforcement community is pretty well-versed in the appropriate response to active shooters: get there, get in, respond to the sounds of the shooter, and rescue the hostages/innocents by capturing or eliminating the threat. Often times, however, active shooter training only emphasizes getting to the shooter and killing the shooter(s). The real goal is to protect hostages/innocents. They are the reason we are rushing in, not for the shooter, because we definitely don’t lower ourselves any further on the priority of life scale.

However, we need to remember that the overall police mission in critical incidents is to save lives, including the suspects. The choice to eliminate the suspect must be made only when saving him can not be accomplished without unduly risking harm to a person higher on the priority of life scale. And yes, that decision may literally be made in micro-seconds, but overall our mindset must be on the priority of life – we went in there to rescue hostages/innocents. Understand that I am not advocating officers to stop and help injured along the way. In a hostage taker situation we must advance as rapidly as possible to the hostages, even overstepping wounded or innocents seeking help.

Remember “why” we do what we do, and it will guide you on the “how” to do what we do right.

In the event of a hostage taker several considerations must be made before action is taken. To successfully weigh our options we need to consider the definition of “Immediate threat” and “Imminent threat”.

Immediate threat – the suspect’s actions are currently causing a serious threat of death or serious physical injury to the hostage.

Imminent threat – the suspect is capable of lethal action and is in close proximity to the hostage creating a jeopardy that the hostage could at any moment be at risk of death or serious physical injury.

At first glance that might seem to be splitting hairs, but it really is not. The important concept for law enforcement to understand (supported by the “reasonable” test of Graham vs. Connor) is that hostages are always in “imminent” danger as long as they are in close proximity to the hostage taker. This means that if we can establish separation of the hostage taker from the hostages, and the hostage taker is not negotiating or surrendering, than police should seriously consider deploying lethal force to end the threat imposed on the hostages.

If the hostage-taker shows “immediate” threat to the hostages than an emergency action plan must be executed to enter and quickly rescue the hostages – often by eliminating the hostage taker. Patrol officers may have to act based on the circumstances presented to them, so it is critically important for the initial patrol officers on scene to correctly assess just what type of situation that they are dealing with.

If however, the hostage taker is negotiating and not presenting an “immediate” threat to the hostages, than perhaps the best course of action is to allow negotiators to work on a planned release of hostages and surrender of the suspect. This must still be done with an Emergency Action entry team ready to go on a moment’s notice.
Hopefully this review of some common critical incidents that patrol officers respond to, along with understanding the priority of life scale, will allow patrol officers to have the understanding to make the proper assessments at the scene, decide on the best course of action, and have the confidence to act.

Photo courtesy of Trung Nguyen

An internationally publicized case of a tragic shooting in which Force Science testimony was given has been decided by a California appellate court in favor of the involved officers.

Controversial from the beginning, the headline-grabbing case concerned a tense standoff between LAPD SWAT and a drug-deranged father who was holding his 19-month-old daughter in his arm as a hostage and human shield. In a desperate showdown, officers killed the offender in a fusillade of bullets–but also, inadvertently, killed the child.

The girl’s mother filed suit, claiming the operators’ reckless and unreasonable use of force and negligent disregard of proper police tactics caused her daughter’s wrongful death. At trial, Dr. Bill Lewinski, executive director of the Force Science Institute, testified on the officers’ behalf, describing in realistic terms the death scene’s chaotic climax.

A Superior Court judge ruled that the plaintiff’s arguments had no documented merit and tossed the case. Now the California Court of Appeal has upheld that decision, in an opinion written by Justice Madeleine Flier. Click here to read it in full.

THE THREAT. On a balmy Sunday in July, 2005, 34-year-old Jose Raul Pena, drunk, coked up and meth-addled, depressed over financial problems, and “emotionally unstable,” turned deadly. After threatening to kill himself and members of his family, he grabbed his baby daughter Suzie and stormed off to the garage/shop of a small used car lot he owned around the corner from his home in Watts, where a standoff with responding police officers shortly ensued. Pena claimed to have access to 2 handguns, a 12 ga. shotgun, and extra ammunition.

“Four times, Pena stood outside the auto shop and shot at officers [with a 9mm Beretta] as he held Suzie in his right arm as a shield,” the appellate decision recounted. Raving that he was Tony Montana from the movie Scarface, he yelled “over 10 times” that he was going to “kill Suzie” and take her “to hell with me,” a phrase from the film. According to an investigative report later, he “told the officers to go ahead and shoot him.”

“I’m going to kill my baby before I leave my baby to my wife, that whore,” the appellate decision quoted him as threatening. He said he’d been in the “Salvadoran military” and knew “how to kill.” He also said he’d been in jail and “wasn’t going back.” Extensive attempts across nearly 3 hours that late afternoon to negotiate a surrender of the child, of Pena or of his weapons were unsuccessful because the hostage-taker “was not being rational and was making constant threats.”

SHOTS FIRED. Five minutes after breaking off communication by disconnecting his phone, Pena again “exited the auto shop, holding Suzie in his right arm.” A SWAT sniper tracked him via rifle scope from inside a Bear Cat parked outside.

“[H]e saw Pena move his hand as if he were about to remove his gun from his waistband,” the appellate decision stated. “[H]e believed Pena was going to shoot Suzie.” The sniper fired; Pena flinched “as if struck” and stumbled back inside.

Immediately, the SWAT team leader ordered 4 operators, specially trained in hostage rescue, to enter the building as a rapid-deployment Emergency Assault Element under his direction and bring the baby to safety.

“When they entered the auto shop, the officers expected Pena to be on the floor as a result of [the sniper's] shot,” Justice Flier wrote. “[I]nstead he was positioned in an interior office,” still alarmingly alive and alarmingly deadly. Quickly he fired “at least six shots through the drywall” in the officers’ direction. One round hit one of the rescue team in the shoulder.

The operators said later they did not retreat because their “mission was to separate Suzie from Pena” and they considered her to be in “imminent peril.” Retreating, their commander said, “would have been a dereliction” of their duty. Instead, the wounded oprator tossed in a flashbang and the stack surged in.

Consider the pandemonium. The office was a tight 8 X 12 feet, filled with smoke and the echoing boom of the grenade. Pena, moving rapidly, continued shooting at officers while still holding his infant daughter as a shield. All 4 officers simultaneously fired back, defending their own lives and, they thought, saving Suzie.

At least 1 of the officers said he was “blinded by muzzle flashes from Pena’s weapon” a few feet from his face, so he could not actually see the child. All concentrated their fire on their assailant’s left side, aware he had consistently held the baby on his right throughout the standoff. “Together the officers fired 50-55 shots inside the office within 3.5 to 6 seconds,” the appellate decision said. In all that fateful Sunday, Pena had himself fired at least 39 rounds before his fatal takedown.

When the smoke cleared, the officers discovered that the baby had been killed, along with her father. Just who fired the fatal round to her head was never determined, although the court said the shooter was 1 of 3 members of the entry team. All carried Colt M4 carbines, according to an investigative report.

“NONSUIT.” The sole basis for the mother’s inevitable lawsuit claiming “negligence and wrongful death” was her allegation that “the officers used unreasonable force” in confronting Pena’s deadly threats, the appellate decision noted. Her only expert witness–a retired LAPD commander who admitted to having no experience, training, or familiarity in SWAT tactics and protocol–opined that retreat and more negotiation would have been preferable to lethal assault.

During the initial 2-week trial in the Superior Court of Judge Rolf Treu in 2009, Bill Lewinski was asked to explain, among other things, how multiple rounds could have missed the suspect in such tight quarters, including the one that struck and killed the child. (An autopsy revealed that Pena had been hit just 6 times.)

That was not a matter of recklessness, Lewinski told the jury, but instead a common dynamic of sudden, life-threatening confrontations of high stress, rapid dynamic movement, and short duration.

Drawing on studies by the Force Science Institute and other research groups, for instance, he documented the typical time required for officers in a shooting to perceive a given threat, interpret its meaning, decide on a response, and perform a reaction. That all can occur within mere micro-seconds, he explained. Yet within that brief timeframe, the scenario they’re confronting can change radically because of split-second movements by the targeted suspect. Officers might not be able to detect the change in enough time to alter the rapid-fire action they’ve initiated.

Unexpected movement by Pena, who was highly agitated and animated, would account for the failure of the highly trained sniper to deliver an effective head shot outside the shop and of the operators who stormed the inner office to put all rounds on their target, despite the close distances. Pena shifting the little girl from one arm to the other could have brought her into the line of fire unexpectedly and unavoidably.

“These were elite officers,” Lewinski told Force Science News. “If LAPD had a Delta team, it would be these guys. Yet they still couldn’t shoot with total accuracy in that difficult situation, not because they were recklessly out of control but because of immutable human limitations.

“Force Science has measured what an ‘instant’ is in a high-stress encounter and what people can and can’t do in that time. My job was to help clarify for the jury how our research on human behavior related to what happened in the confrontations with Pena.”

After attorneys for both sides had rested their case and minutes before closing arguments were to start, Judge Treu abruptly called a halt to the trial. In response to a defense motion, he found that “reasonable jurors here could only draw one conclusion from the evidence presented, and that was that the officers’ use of force was reasonable.” In short, the matter was a “nonsuit,” and he issued a directed verdict aborting the case.

It was this ruling, challenged by the plaintiff, that the appellate court upheld.

APPELLATE REASONING. In the appeal, the plaintiff’s attorneys argued that Treu’s nonsuit ruling was improper because no probable cause had existed either for the sniper’s initial use of deadly force against Pena or for the rescue team’s use of lethal force during its final assault.

The appellate decision characterized this claim as a “nonsensical interpretation of the evidence.”

The evidence was “overwhelming,” Justice Flier wrote, “that Pena posed a danger to Suzie,” even though he did not point his gun directly at her. He had made numerous verbal threats to kill her, and the sniper was “not required to wait” until Pena pointed his gun at her and actually “pulled the trigger to conclude that [the] threats were real and exposed Suzie to great risk.”

As for the final shootout, the appellate panel agreed with the trial court that the operators “had probable cause and rights within their discretion to go in after Pena, particularly since there were shots fired from inside the room out and the officers could reasonably have believed [these] may involve Suzie.”

Addressing the multitude of rounds fired, the officers’ “concurrent shooting multiple times at Pena cannot constitute excessive force under an objective standard,” the appellate decision stated. Case law has established that the “number of shots by itself cannot be determinative as to whether the force used was reasonable. That multiple shots were fired does not suggest the officers shot mindlessly as much as it indicates that they sought to ensure the elimination of a deadly threat.”

Any belief by the plaintiff “that the officers should have stopped after each shot and assessed its effect” when Pena was shooting directly at them was unrealistic from “the perspective of [a] reasonable officer at the scene,” the court declared.

Tragic as the unintended death of the child was, the decision concluded, “retreating when Suzie remained in danger would have been a dereliction of duty…. [C]onsidering the exigency of the circumstances,” the officers acted properly in pursuing the father who threatened her life and “used reasonable care in employing deadly force.”

For a complimentary subscription to Force Science News, an e-newsletter provided free by the Force Science Institute, visit www.forcescience.org or e-mail your contact information to: editor@forcescience.org

Photo courtesy of Oregon DOT

This is the first article in a series that will focus attention on the needs of patrol officers to be tactically minded and response capable. At the same time I’m going to discuss current philosophies about the proper patrol response to critical incidents such as active shooters, and barricaded subjects.

One of the most basic tenets of law enforcement is the protection of life. “To serve and protect” is probably the most universal mission statement of American law enforcement. In that regard I want to examine the “Priorities of Life” and make sure that patrol officers understand the order and its significance when they are confronted with the most critical incidents we face.

Simply put the “Priority of Life” is demonstrated in this order:

1. Hostages/Victims
2. Innocent by-standers
3. Police/First Responders
4. Suspects/Subjects.

As sworn defenders we must recognize that we may have to endanger ourselves to save others in harm. I put the first responders (firemen and paramedics) along side police because they are also first responders. As such, they realize that their duty may place them into harm’s way, and as such our efforts to protect them cannot be accomplished at the expense of the first two groups of people.

A suspect is someone believed to have committed a crime. A subject usually refers to someone who is suffering mental illness, suicidal, or under the influence of alcohol or drugs that may still pose a serious safety threat, but their original intent was not criminal activity.

It is also very important to emphasize that police officers should not lower themselves on that priority list by unnecessarily exposing themselves to danger simply to capture a suspect. This will be addressed in greater detail in Part II when I cover the proper considerations for handling high risk warrants or barricaded subject calls.
In most critical incidents patrol officers have been taught the “Four C’s”:

• C-Contain
• C-Control
• C-Communicate
• C-Call SWAT

However, patrol officers may be called upon to take immediate emergency action because in some circumstances the need to act won’t wait for S.W.A.T.. To do so safely, patrol officers need to know the most common methods (tactics) for ending hazardous incidents in buildings or residences. This is not for routine calls, but for the high risk calls.

These are the tactics that S.W.A.T. teams train and perform on a regular basis. Patrol officers need to know more options than just knocking on the door, or kicking the door and rushing in. The most commonly recognized tactics are:

Take Down Away – (usually only used in ending hostage situations – officers allow the suspect to leave and then take him down in a pre-planned area away from the hostages or innocents)
Surround and Call-out – (containment on the outside while ordering the occupants to exit)
Breach & Hold – (opening a door or window, but staying outside of the threshold while giving orders for occupants to exit)
Limited Penetration – (Only entering to a pre-determined area of the residence)
Controlled Entry – (clearing the residence using the best practices of cover, light control & controlled movements – not slow and deliberate, but not “dynamic” either)

Patrol officers will still need to establish inner and outer perimeters to control the scene, select an arrest team in the event the suspect exits or an emergency entry is required, and assess the environment for other potential officer safety issues.

Finally, every officer must continually assess their ability to take another human being’s life. The taking of life should never be viewed lightly, but as professional law enforcement officers our duty may demand that we take a life to save a life. The priorities of life are just, reasonable, and morally and legally sustainable. Understanding the proper tactics for a given situation builds confidence into action. Having those foundations thoroughly thought out should allow the patrol officer to properly handle the critical incident that the citizens expect them to handle.

In future articles, I will discuss patrol options for responding to active shooters, barricaded subjects, and hostage situations. I will also discuss the need for patrol officers to be armed with patrol rifles and other tactical tools that will allow them to successfully resolve active tactical situations they are confronted with.

Stay safe!

A real deadly force encounter is likely to be very dynamic: the officer should be moving, the perp will be moving, various innocents may be moving in the area, and there will be all sorts of inanimate objects that may be cover…or just trip you as you move. How you train will dictate how you perform when the bullets start flying.

As an example of good technique, view the video below. On November 15, 2007, Altamonte Springs, FL police officers responded to a reported robbery of a hotel near Interstate 4. For those that are unfamiliar with the area, this is just outside of Orlando.

A 10-year veteran officer observed and attempted to stop a red Ford Focus that matched the description of the vehicle that had left the scene of the robbery. As the police officer approached the car, the passenger opened fire. The driver, who was kidnapped by the passenger, fled from the car. The officer returned fire and struck the suspect multiple times, ending the threat.

What I think is important about this video is the use of movement. The officer assumes a solid isosoles stance, and then moves laterally while engaging the shooter. The suspect on the other hand, remained mostly static, as he was inside of a car and could not move off the officer’s line of fire. The end result? The officer was not hit, but the suspect was hit multiple times.

I don’t know if Altamonte Springs PD incorporates lateral movement into the firearms training, or if this officer practiced this independently, but it worked. Think seriously about incorporating movement into your practice sessions, and work with your department to incorporate movement into the department training program.

Stay safe!

Click here to view the embedded video.

Don’t believe me? Read Terror at Beslan: A Russian Tragedy with Lessons for America’s Schools.

In 2004, terrorists took over a Russian school for three days. While the authorities attempted to negotiate, the terrorists forced the captive men and boys into slave labor to fortify the school against the inevitable attack. As the hostages completed their work, they would be executed.

Meanwhile, the women and girls were repeatedly raped and then killed.

When the counter-attack on the school began, the terrorists began wildly killing the children. Police and SWAT teams encountered barricades and booby traps, hindering their progress. It was a blood bath.

172 children were murdered.

In all, 338 people were killed, and some 700 were wounded.  The number I always keep coming back to, though, is the 172 children who were murdered.

Don’t think it can happen here? You better think again.

There are terrorists training right now to do even worse in the US of A. There is credible intel that indicates some of them have already made there way into the county (across our southern border, in case anyone in Washington is listening.) They are implementing the lessons they learned during the attack on the Russian school.

Al-Qaeda has publicly stated they will kill 2 million American children.  Operations in Afghanistan have recovered videotapes of terrorists training to overrun schools.  These tapes include the terrorists giving orders in English and killing children.

Here is what an attack may look like in this country:

The terrorists will strike multiple schools at the same time, so law enforcement and military resources are unable to focus on a single event. Terrorists have already begun scouting targets, and will continue to do so right up to the events. Terrorists are seeking the best sites that combine:

• states without citizen CCW permits
• states without a gun/hunting tradition
• jurisdictions that do not issue rifles to their officers
• rural or other geographically isolated areas to slow police response
• schools without SROs

Expect to encounter car bombs, or similar IEDs, in the parking lots or other areas that responders may set up in. We saw the same thing in Atlanta (although a much smaller scale) when Eric Rudolph set up secondary devices to hit public safety officials as they responded to the initial bombs.

Killing School Resource Officers will, of course, be part of the initial goals. In our “gun free zones,” SROs are likely to be the only initial threat to the terrorists.

Negotiating will only give the terrorists more time to fortify their position, and kill more children.

The terrorists have learned their lessons, and are advancing in their plans. What have we learned?

There are a lot of things that departments can do to increase our ability to detect and react to these threats. The sad truth is, few, if any, local governments will adequately prepare for these dangers. We will lose our children, and many good cops will die trying to save them. I believe any of us would willingly give our own lives to protect innocent children. What angers me is that our political leaders refuse to allow us the training and tools to save as many as we can.