In the first instance, an officer rolled up on an unknown situation in the middle of a large intersection.  A Good Samaritan was trying to hold down an out-of-control girl who was screaming “Kill me!” over and over again at the top of her lungs.

The officer and citizen managed to keep the 90 lbs. girl on the ground.  Another officer arrived to replace the citizen.  Now with two officers trying to handcuff her, the girl began to fight and actually began pushing up off the pavement with them on her back.

The first officer unloaded a can of OC into the girl’s face.  It had no effect and she pretty much drank it like a Slurpee.  Whirling around, she kicked the female officer in the groin.  The crazed girl was finally subdued and taken for medical treatment.

At the hospital, she became lucid and told officers she had ingested three mushrooms.  She asked what had happened to her.  She did not recall the fight in the intersection.

The next night officers responded to a local McDonald’s for a man running around the parking lot shouting that people were chasing him and trying to kill him.  In his paranoid state, he did not believe the uniformed officers were really the police.

As in the last case, the fight was on when the officers tried to take him into custody for psychiatric evaluation.  Unfortunately, this guy was well over 300 lbs.  The officers used good tactics and took him to the ground immediately and decisively, preventing anyone from getting seriously injured.

At the scene, the man began to struggle on the ambulance gurney and tore out an IV in his arm, sending blood spurting.  A clip on the IV tube cut one of the officers on the wrist and that officer also went to the hospital for an exposure evaluation.  The suspect’s blood tested negative for any biohazards.

After being sedated at the ER, this man said he had smoked synthetic marijuana sold as “K2.”  Hospital records showed he had been in the ER before for erratic behavior after smoking this same substance.

Whether they are on psilocybin mushrooms, synthetic marijuana, or any hallucination-producing mood modifier, the suspects’ violent and unpredictable behavior is dangerous to police officers and deputies.

For some reason we are seeing more of the psilocybin mushrooms in my area.  We had an impaired driver in our holding cell on a DUI charge.  He suddenly lost it and began ramming his body into the reinforced glass wall.  He started screaming for us to help him, but he displayed aggressive actions toward us.  We fought him on to a stretcher and took him to the ER.  They heavily sedated him to put him out of his hallucinogenic “shroom rage.”

In the old days, we fought with bad guys on phencyclidine, called PCP or angel dust, which had powerful hallucinogenic effects.  The drug was said to give people superhuman strength and resistance to pain.

Suspects on any of these hallucinogenic drugs do have a heightened resistance to pain compliance, mainly because the drugs dull any physical sensations.  Along the same line, they seem to display uncanny strength, but they can exert maximum physical effort because they do not feel fatigue, lactic acid build-up, or pain associated with broken body parts.

The most dangerous side effect of hallucinogens is their distortion of a person’s reality.  They may be reacting to what they perceive as a life-threatening situation to them.  Because of this, normal moral inhibitions do not come into play.  They may be totally committed to murdering you to save themselves from the “monsters.”

Another deadly consideration for our routine day at the office.

Randall is a twenty-four year sworn police officer in a mid-sized Florida police department.  He has been an FTO, K9 Handler, Detective, and SWAT Team Leader.  He is currently the K9 Unit Sergeant and department SWAT Coordinator.

LIGHTS OUT! TECHNIQUES FOR DARKNESS

There are times when remaining in near darkness is actually a great advantage to officers. Here are a few situations where being in near darkness is actually a benefit:

• Maintaining a perimeter position.
• Moving through open areas that offer little cover and are exposed to the suspect.
• Crossing fatal funnels.
• Moving through fatal funnels.
• Hiding from your supervisor … uh, wait, different article!

When on perimeter duty for trying to lock down a fleeing criminal it could definitely be advantageous to remain in near darkness and allow our sense of hearing or smell to assist us. Standing around with a light on full-time may be beneficial if we are absolutely certain the perimeter was set up in time. In that case the light should lock the suspect down, or at least identify his flight path. If we aren’t sure, or we’re dealing with a known armed suspect, then setting up a perimeter in darkness may be more appropriate.

Whether inside a structure or in an open field, movement across open areas is of particular concern to officers. In most situations this movement should be completed with as little or no light as possible. This would be a great opportunity to mix techniques. Officers could intermittently light up an area they want to cross for the purpose of identifying obvious trip hazards or other obstacles. Then, under the concealment of darkness, officers could move across that area in a reasonably safe manner. Again, noise discipline will be a critical concern in these situations as well.

Crossing fatal funnels is a horrible reality that officers must face. A fatal funnel is any location that focuses the area a suspect can expect police movement. This could be a doorway, a window, a hallway, a pathway through woods, etc. This obviously increases the chances that an officer will be attacked while in the funnel. Since this type of movement is frequent in police work, officers should investigate as many techniques as they can find on how to successfully navigate this threat area.

One of the things that an officer might be able to control is the amount of light available at the funnel. After using other lighting techniques to “quick peek” or “cut the pie” the officer can go “lights out” and rapidly move across the funnel under concealment of darkness. “Cutting the pie” allows the officer to remain behind a position of cover while exposing the majority of the room for officer inspection. The final movement is to “quick peek” the deep corners before moving into the room. In this manner the entire room can be examined before crossing the threshold.

Communication with other officers is critical so they don’t back light an officer during this movement. “Lights out” should tell all other officers that a movement in darkness is about to occur, and they need to turn their lights off and be quiet. “Lights out” means lights out! In most circumstances, this instruction will come from the lead officer, but may come from a cover officer who senses a threat from an area different from the main objective.

Limited communication is just as important, it should not let the suspect know what the officers are doing. Loudly proclaiming “lights out so I can cross this doorway” defeats the aspect of surprise. Officers should be comfortable with limited and quiet communications that are brief and to the point.

Another time that “lights out” should be considered is when officers are finally ready to move through the funnel and into a room. From “painting” and “cutting the pie” officers should have a good idea of a clear movement path. Obviously with furniture in the room there are still possible areas that a suspect could hide. When ready officers can call for “lights out” and then move into the room under darkness. Once in the room, officers can relight using an intermittent light technique until the room is clear or a suspect is located, at which time a full-time lighting technique should be used.

Moving into a room should be a considered and deliberate movement. This is not a slow movement, but movement with a plan. Officers still want to clear the funnel as quickly as possible, as there might be ambient light that partially back lights them. To accomplish this officers should move into the room and immediately step away from the doorway a few steps. This clears them from the funnel and allows room for backing officers to enter the room as well. Once inside the room officers should turn lights on to clear any remaining threat areas (like behind furniture).

There are two basic methods for entering the room – crossing and button-hook. In the crossing method, an officer is on one side of the doorway (e.g. left), steps into the room, and then steps across to the other side of the doorway on the inside of the room (right). This is the most natural form of movement into the room that still clears the funnel.

In the button-hook method, an officer is on one side of the doorway (e.g. left), steps into the room and immediately spins back in the same direction (going left), in effect following the contour of the wall they were using as cover.

In either method the officer should take 2-3 steps into the room to clear room for other officers to enter. Going too far into the room will cut off the angle necessary for backing officers to provide additional firepower should an immediate threat be realized. In addition, the officer should move in a manner that places them 3-5 feet away from the wall. This creates a moving target for any suspect that is hiding in the deep corner. If the officer simply moves along the wall they only create a bigger target.

The obvious concerns for the officers are the deep corners and these should be checked first. The deep corners are the ones adjacent to the walls of the room or hallway the officers are in before entering. Using lighting techniques officers should be able to observe the far corners from a position of cover, but the deep corners are often difficult to observe even with a “quick peek” due to furniture or other obstacles.

Once in the room the officers should sweep their weapons inward until the entire room is covered, but not crossing over their partners area to avoid “lasering” each other. Continuing to move while clearing obstacles is a good idea as long as officers are aware of their muzzle and do not laser each other and communication between officers remains constant. Once the room has been thoroughly checked a pre-set communication should be given, such as “nothing seen” or “clear”.

HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

Many agencies do not have the luxury of a full-time S.W.A.T. Team, or even a part-time team that can be assembled in a reasonable amount of time. This is especially true in more rural areas where agencies may be a part of a multi-jurisdictional team that requires even more time to assemble. Whether it is the initial patrol officers or a S.W.A.T. Team that is handling a hostage taker situation, each style of lighting can be utilized.

The intermittent use of light can be an extremely effective tool in the event that the hostage taker must be taken out. Obviously the best use of intermittent light would be if the hostage taker and hostage are in a darkened area. If the hostage rescue has to be performed in a lighted area I would still recommend officers use light on the hostage taker’s eyes to further distract them from officers’ movements.

In a darkened hostage rescue action officers can decide on two methods to engage the hostage taker. These techniques are meant for the common situation where the hostage taker is behind the hostage and holding the hostage close to themselves. The point of these techniques is to get officers close enough to the hostage taker to allow officers to take a head shot on the hostage taker that affords the utmost certainty of avoiding the hostage.

In the first method some of the cover officers can continue to have full-time light on the hostage taker, while other officers move in the peripheral areas to a point where they can engage the hostage taker. The advantage of this is that there will be enough ambient light for the officers to move into position and see the hostage taker. The disadvantages are that the hostage taker is not going to like the light on them, and the ambient light may expose the officers moving in and cause the hostage taker to take action against the hostage.

In the second method the officers maintain full-time light on the hostage taker until they have a reasonable plan of action decided. Then they can go “lights out” which has the appearance of doing what the hostage taker wants from them. Instead, with the hostage taker’s eyes now very much compromised to the dark, the officer(s) can stealthily but quickly take a flanking movement to the hostage taker’s position. At the last possible moment the officer illuminates the hostage taker and takes as near of a contact head shot as possible to ensure ending the hostage taker’s threat, while avoiding injury to the hostage.

Now before any negotiators or administrators write any scathing responses about not trying to talk the hostage taker down I will restate the purpose of this article – low- light techniques. Yes, officers should first try to negotiate or talk hostage takers into releasing their hostages and surrendering. But when the situation has obviously deteriorated and the officers have a reasonable belief that the hostage is in immediate danger of serious physical injury or death, than the officers must act. And in order to act effectively they need to practice techniques that will give them the best advantage. That is the only point of this article.

With disciplined practice, the techniques in this article will help officers to confidently tackle whatever scenario they face in darkness, and actually come to appreciate the benefits of darkness. I would highly recommend that officers review this material and perhaps practice some of the techniques, but seek out qualified training in the area of low-light engagements to fully appreciate the proper methods of using light.

Aaron is a sergeant with a midwestern police department, where he serves as a trainer, supervisor and SWAT sniper. In addition to his broad tactical knowledge, Aaron has experience in DUI, DRE and undercover narcotics investigations.

USING LIGHT INTERMITTENTLY (ON/OFF MODE)

The intermittent use of light is one of the most advantageous methods of flashlight use for law enforcement, but also one of the most misunderstood and misused methods. With this technique, officers should only be turning their flashlights on for a brief lighting, or making rapid on/off switches of their flashlight. Here are some examples where intermittent light is needed:

• Initial lighting for areas of concern to the officer.
• Lighting an area that the officer is preparing to move into.
• Communicating to other officers areas they should focus on, or to communicate the direction of travel for officers.
• Relighting an area after making a movement in total darkness.
• Making quick peek observations into unknown areas.
• Engaging a hostage taker during an emergency action movement.

Obviously lights with a strobe function can simply be turned on to strobe for brief times to illuminate areas of need. Otherwise, officers should turn the light off when they feel that area is reasonably clear, to provide themselves with the concealment of darkness. This on/off method of light use acts to confuse the suspect as to what our intentions are and where we might be going. In general people have trouble gauging time and distance without light. This on/off method of light use compounds the confusion for the suspect because it makes it nearly impossible to accurately judge where an officer is, or where they are going.

Officers need to train and practice extensively to be comfortable in the dark. There is a reason that our troops are so successful in Iraq and Afghanistan – we rule the dark, through night vision optics and proper illumination techniques! Ask a veteran and I’ll bet they’ll tell you they’d rather fight at night than in daylight. Many high risk duties occur at night so we should be that comfortable as well.

The brain is a remarkable instrument if trained properly. Practice moving through dark houses, buildings and yards with very little use of light. An officer could easily gain the skills to observe a room or area with only a few momentary bursts of light, and then actually move through that room or area relatively safely in darkness. Imagine the suspect’s surprise as they try to track the officer’s movement, see the light in one area or room, and then only moments later the light appears (briefly) in an entirely new area.

Now to be sure, this technique is best used when we are in search mode and have to go through open areas that do not offer much cover. I understand that in search mode our mindset must always be thinking that there IS a suspect hiding somewhere in the area we are going, whether in that room or the next, so we must move as stealthily as possible. Maintaining noise discipline is just as important as light discipline during these movements.

If contact is made, or something peeks the officers interest, than another intermittent light use should be employed to examine that area of concern. If a suspect is located, than we switch to full-time light as mentioned above. In a situation where an officer was on the move, it would be necessary for the officer to maintain full- time light on the suspect, while continuing to move to a position of cover.

Through dozens of force-on-force scenarios (often with SWAT officers as bad guys) I can tell you that proper use of intermittent lighting causes the “suspects” to be very concerned that the pain train is coming unless they surrender!

I have had the luxury of training with officers and instructors that have hundreds of hours of low-light techniques training and experience, and I can attest that the confidence to perform well in darkness can be achieved fairly quickly if practiced correctly. And when you use the proper techniques the effects are devastating for those who wait in hiding to do you harm, or who simply try to stay hidden.

Another good example of intermittent light is when officers perform a “quick peek”. The quick peek is done when an officer is in a position of cover, behind a wall or at a door frame for example, and the officer wants to examine where they are going without exposing themselves for long. A quick peek in most cases will be performed after the officer has “cut the pie”. “Cutting the pie” is a technique where officers slowly and deliberately move around corners to examine the area past that corner – most commonly at doorways, or the ends of hallways.

In the quick peek method an officer holds at the position of cover, and first uses their other senses. Yeah, use of flashlights is great but don’t forget the other senses while doing so. If you are at that position of cover and smell a cigarette, or body odor, or hear noise then stay behind cover and call the bad guy out to you on your terms! If you don’t have any other sensual stimulus but you still want to confirm that the area you are going into is relatively safe use the quick peek.

To do this, the officer must concentrate on what they are doing to get the timing right. When the officer is ready they will move in darkness to a point where their light, gun, and eyes can see where they want to look. This should only expose the bare minimum of the officer’s body. As soon as the officer is in that position conduct a quick on/off of their flashlight in the direction that the officer wants to see. Once done immediately withdraw back to cover.

The goal of a “quick peek” is to allow the officer to see into a threat area, but not long enough to give a suspect time to fire or attack the officer. The officer is taking a snap-shot picture of what he saw, and allowing that picture to develop while in cover like an old Polaroid instant picture did (younger officers Google it!).

If the officer needs to look in the other direction into the hot area, than they need to make sure they displace and conduct their “quick peek” from a different position (kneeling, modified prone, etc.). The quick peek should be performed from start to finish in about one second, less for those who are highly practiced in the technique.

Depending on the circumstances, the officer can follow with “painting” the room or moving on to another area, hopefully under the concealment of darkness. Something officers should remember is that all of these techniques are tools for the officers. Officers should not feel compelled or bound to follow a certain set of rules on using their flashlight, but instead take all of these techniques into the field and use the ones that are appropriate for the situation they find themselves in.

With all the good that the on/off or intermittent use of light brings, this area of light use also brings with it a certain mystique and plenty of naysayers. I firmly believe that those who aren’t fans have either never tried it, or more likely, have tried it incorrectly and quickly discarded the technique because of early failures. To be certain, this method of light use requires the highest level of training and practice, otherwise it will lose its powerful and positive effect.

An example of a failure to properly use intermittent light would be an officer who simply flashes some light in a certain area but doesn’t take mental photographs of what they are seeing. In that case the officer has simply wasted time and effort. An officer must train themselves to know that they are going to briefly turn the light on, and train the brain to respond to the limited stimulus by recording information. It is very possible! You’ll be amazed at the amount of detail and information you can gather from a flash of light that is on less than one second.

TRY THIS EXPERIMENT OF THE QUICK PEEK

Have an officer stand in the deep corner of a room (the corner that is adjacent to the doorway) and make the room as dark as possible. That officer will do something particular for the lighting officer to identify (make a peace symbol, be sitting with hands up, have hands in a position to shoot, etc.). The officer with the light will move their head (eyes), flashlight, and training weapon into the room while still dark to do a quick peek. Start with no time limits so the movements can be mastered. Then as officers master the movements, start dialing it in with time restrictions – must be completed in 2 seconds, 1.5 seconds, 1 second.

After the officer has moved back to cover allow their brain to start developing that picture. Then ask the lighting officer what they saw in as much detail as possible. Once the lighting officer does well with one officer, try two or three, or have other types of objects or stimulus for them to identify. You’ll be amazed about how much information you can gather in such a short time.

One thing to remember is that action is always faster than reaction. Here, we are expecting that our action will be faster than the suspect’s reaction. This requires a combination of speed and skill. As you train this technique and start feeling more comfortable, step it up a notch. Get everyone in protective gear (full face masks, etc.) and give the “suspect” a Sims or Airsoft gun. Let the “suspect” know that they have a green light to shoot the officer whenever they have a chance. Then let the officers perform the same drills.

The successful officers will come away even more convinced of their abilities in darkness. If an officer is hit then review why they were hit – too long exposed, improper lighting, talking out loud to partners about what they’re going to do, or peeking from the same point repeatedly.

The quick peek has limitations. If done improperly the picture will not provide the officer enough information to make decisions. If the officer lights up before entering the room then they have telegraphed their movement and are susceptible to danger. If the officer lights up as they are leaving there won’t be enough information to process. And if the officer stays in the room too long they are open to danger.

This technique requires practice, practice, practice!

Another thing to remember is the rule of 3! This is an old war rule that says the first to light a cigarette gets the enemies attention. The second to light a cigarette zeroes the enemy onto location. And the third to light gets the bullet! Same goes here with lighting. If you need to do another quick peek DO NOT do it from the same position you just performed!

Displace to kneeling or even modified prone (if you’re really good at it) and look from a whole new area. Suspects believe you’re going to engage them from standing and can guesstimate where you will be coming through that door. You can light up from high while your head is low, or light up low while your head is high. Suspects are naturally attracted to the light so this technique should give even more protection for your noggin.

Coming up, the final installment on Flashlight Tactics.

Aaron is a sergeant with a midwestern police department, where he serves as a trainer, supervisor and SWAT sniper. In addition to his broad tactical knowledge, Aaron has experience in DUI, DRE and undercover narcotics investigations.

Awareness is the best way to avoid an attack.  Once the attack happens, even under good circumstances, you are likely in for a world of hurt.  This comes to us from Gabe Suarez’s Warrior Talk newsletter:

Fred was temporarily assigned to county jail until he caught the chain for a nickel at CDC…probably Soledad. He was a convict, and the ink on his arms was a resume of murders and other miscellaneous violence. Fred worked for me. His main goal in life was to be able to write to his wife and kids while he was inside. Funny what a pad of paper and a few pencils and envelops can get you.

I asked him once when we were out of earshot. He had stabbed plenty of enemies in his life, many never accounted for in the legal system.

“You grab the shank like this”, he showed it held in forward grip close to the body. “Slap ‘em in the face like this…then run it in hard and fast until he drops. Shank ‘em in the guts and in the balls”. He explained how that worked well against one target…specially if he was bigger than you.

“If you have two or three you need to take, grab it like this”, he showed reverse grip. “Attack the face, then when they block, trap the hand and stab hard into the neck…leave that guy and go for the next one, then come back for seconds”.

Most guys that study the knife study from the perceived notion of defending against the knife. They begin with the premise that they are unarmed and that the bad man has the knife. In reality that is as difficult a place to begin as facing a skilled gunman already pointed in at 5 yards, finger on the trigger, and you have no gun. Why do we do that to ourselves? If at the beginning of the fight, you are thinking, “Oh me … oh my…I am going to get in legal hot water for this”, you have already lost.

Perhaps its time to get the mind right about this subject and leave the nonsense and foolishness aside. If we change the point of view to a man armed with a knife, the entire table changes. Perhaps it is time to leave the “Unarmed Good Guy facing The Knife Armed bad Guy” illusion and look at reality through different, darker, and more violent eyes.

My thanks to Gabe Suarez for the permission to reprint the article here.  I strongly encourage you to check out his training and to sign up for his free Warrior Talk newsletter.

There have been tremendous advances in flashlight technology over that last decade, and law enforcement has greatly benefited from the many new features that can be found on relatively inexpensive flashlights. Along with those advances have come new techniques for using an old familiar friend.

Manufacturers like Streamlight, Surefire, Blackhawk, Maglite, Insight, and others have started making smaller, lighter flashlights with incredibly higher light output. These new lights are much smaller, usually only 4-5 inches long and about 1-inch in and no bigger than the average person’s palm. Instead of heavy D-cell batteries, cops went to AA and the new CR123 batteries. And the newer lights introduced a thumb-activated on/off switch on the tail cap.

Advancements in bulb technology has led in the direction of LED or similar bulbs that create even higher light output, with the benefit of longer lasting run time. With the LED advancement, flashlights have added different light settings including high output, low output, and even strobe and dimming functions on some lights.

In this article I hope to explore some of the benefits of the smaller “tactical” flashlights, and combine that with some low-light techniques that every patrol officer should be familiar with to succeed in the dark.

USING LIGHT FULL-TIME

There are times when having your flashlight on continuously is a benefit to the officer. Here are a few examples:

• Interviewing subjects on stops or calls . It allows officers to keep a clear view of the subjects hands and movements, while offering a distraction (by shining the light in the subject’s eyes) should the person become less cooperative.
• Writing citations or notes in the field.
• Searching for evidence or missing persons.
• Directing traffic at crash scenes.

Another great time to keep light on full-time is once a suspect has been located during a search. At that point, we need to use the light to its fullest ability to hamper our suspect’s ability to see us or adjust to the rapid changes from dark to light. Plus we want to see every movement that our suspect makes to identify signs of fight or flight.

Full-time light in this situation can have a paralyzing effect on people who are surrounded by darkness. Humans rely heavily on eyesight for external stimulus and information, so taking away a suspect’s eyes with full light is a very beneficial thing. Full-time light also provides us with our best sight picture in the event of a deadly force or other applied force situation.

When using light full-time officers should be keenly aware of using the light to its greatest advantage. What I mean is that the light should be used to blind the suspect or illuminate the suspect’s hands. Hands kill us so we have to know what they are doing or holding. Once we have established that the hands are empty than the officer should use the light to eliminate the suspect’s ability to see, and therefore eliminate their ability to develop an organized plan of attack, resistance, or escape.

Some officers have advocated turning all lights on during an interior check, and although there are some benefits to this method, there are also times where it leaves us at a disadvantage. For instance, if you turn a light on in a living room you are completely illuminated, but a suspect in the darkened adjacent kitchen or hallway may not be visible. In addition, officers have to cross completely lit territory in order to continue clearing the areas of uncertainty.

A good home defense technique is to leave a hallway light on so if an intruder enters your darkened room you have the complete advantage, being hidden, while they are completely backlit. The same thing applies to officers and can be used against us.

Officers that train and practice operating in the dark, can actually become quite comfortable being in the dark or semi-lit conditions. In these training scenarios, the darkness becomes our friend, and we are able to use it for our advantage.

PAINTING WITH LIGHT

Another way of using full-time light to our advantage is the method of “painting” the light. Instead of simply pointing the light in one general direction, think about painting a wall. There is a lot of up/down and side to side movement, and probably some diagonal movement too so that the whole wall is covered and there are no obvious signs of brush strokes. This same movement can be used in the full-time lighting method to confuse suspects.

Try keeping your flashlight on and then moving your flashlight in rapid and different directions. Nothing extreme, in fact shorter and more controlled movements are better, but changing the patterns continuously. This gives a great amount of light for the officer to examine their surroundings but is very confusing to the suspect because it does not allow them the ability to determine how far away you are with your light. In some situations it will even confuse the suspect from knowing where the light is coming from, because light will be hitting all the walls, ceiling and angles, creating confusing shadows and light patterns.

Try this with your fellow officers. Have them hide in a darkened room or down a hallway. Use the method as described above and ask them how well they could determine where you were. They might have a general sense of where you are coming from but not an exact distance. This is great in a hallway where a suspect may be hiding around the corner.

Using this method and being quiet may allow you to move in the hallway without the give-away signs of how close you are getting that happens by leaving your light on and pointed in one position down the hall. Noise discipline is important here too, because the more stimulus you give out the easier it is for the suspect to start triangulating position.

Aaron is a sergeant with a midwestern police department, where he serves as a trainer, supervisor and SWAT sniper. In addition to his broad tactical knowledge, Aaron has experience in DUI, DRE and undercover narcotics investigations.

The family did not hear nearby gunfire, only fireworks. When they rushed to the boy, he had blood coming from his nose and mouth. Family members did not know he was shot. They took him straight to a hospital.

It was theorized by the Hillsborough County, FL Sheriff’s Office that the bullet which critically injured the boy was fired from miles away. Media reports ironically call these shots “celebratory gunfire.” I think that is in poor taste.

I worked Mids on New Year’s Eve last week. At Readoff, I observed how I was taught to park under a bank overhang or other roof at Midnight on New Year’s Eve or the Fourth of July to stay out of the way of falling bullets. Not being on a call just before Midnight, I parked my CVPI in a bank drive thru. I could hear distant (and not so distant) gunfire.

About fifteen minutes later, our units were dispatched to a child hit by a bullet. When our guys got on scene, they found out the child was, thankfully, not hurt. This falling bullet had pierced the roof of the child’s mobile home and landed on the scared kid. It easily could have found a less protected target.

It is unfortunate that we would have to defend ourselves against such illegal, negligent, and unnecessary behavior as “celebratory gunfire,” but we must. The boy in my city was extremely lucky. The 12 year old in Ruskin was not. He is currently in a coma.

Randall is a twenty-four year police officer in Florida. He is currently his department’s K9 Sergeant and SWAT Coordinator.

Photo courtesy of Lewisha Jones

In a unique production assisted by the Force Science Institute, law enforcement authorities in an Oregon county have created an online video that explains to civilians the realities of officer-involved shootings and counters prevalent myths fostered by Hollywood fantasies.

In 17 minutes, the program ranges from addressing why officers don’t try to shoot knives out of the hands of attackers to how cell phone and dash-cam recordings can significantly distort impressions of deadly force encounters. In all, the production tackles 7 persistent misconceptions that often lead to unjust accusations of wrongdoing regarding police use of force and provides scientific insights into the true dynamics of life-or-death confrontations.

The video, called “Hollywood vs. Reality: Officer-Involved Shootings,” can be viewed online by clicking here. (DVD copies are also available. See below.)Officials who posted it for public viewing are willing to share it with other agencies as a valuable educational tool.

BACKSTORY. Several years ago, after a series of hotly protested police shootings in Portland, the state’s major metropolitan area, the Oregon legislature mandated that each county devise a “more standardized and transparent” system for “managing” OISs. Included was a directive that each county conduct annual “community outreach and education” on law enforcement’s use of deadly force.

Lane County, whose seat is the city of Eugene, was “among the first to respond with a protocol,” according to DA Alex Gardner. Among other things, law enforcement agencies in the county, plus the Oregon State Police, organized an Interagency Deadly Force Investigative Team to probe each OIS and forward evidence gathered to the DA’s office for assessment.

To fulfill the public education requirement, the county launched a series of high-profile events, beginning with daylong instruction and exercises that involved exposing local reporters and politicians to shoot/don’t shoot scenario training.

“Running civilians through scenarios is expensive, and in this area there’s considerable turnover among news reporters, so the effective benefit is not always lasting,” says Melinda McLaughlin Kletzok, the PIO for Eugene PD and a reserve deputy for the Lane County SO.

For 2011′s community education, she told Force Science News, it was decided to produce a video that “could always be online” for public access–”something that would counter the kind of misinformation that seems to commonly arise after any OIS.” This, she says, would allow basic facts about deadly force to be communicated even when officials couldn’t comment publicly on the specifics of an ongoing investigation.

Dr. Bill Lewinski, executive director of the Force Science Institute, was in Eugene last January for a 2-day Force Science training seminar and agreed to appear on camera to deliver pertinent findings emerging from FSI research. At about the same time, Dr. Alexis Artwohl, a Force Science board advisor and certification course faculty member known for her work in police behavioral science, was participating in a training program elsewhere in the state. She joined in the video production also. Kletzok coordinated the project, which was filmed and edited by the professional production company Attic Media.

In the finished program, other contributors–Eugene Ofcr. Joe Kidd, Oregon State Police Sgt. Alan Gilbert, and DA Gardner–offer their particular perspectives on OISs. But the most extensive content comes from Lewinski and Artwohl.

HOLLYWOOD BRAINWASHING. In the opening minutes, Artwohl points out 3 ironies about the public perception of OISs:

• civilians commonly expect “these events to defy the laws of physics”;
• officers are expected “to defy the limits of human performance” by having “perfect memories and perfect decision-making, when research clearly shows” that to be impossible;
• “the judgment of police officers is often based on myths, assumptions, and personal opinions that may not necessarily be true.”

Gardner then suggests that these critical misconceptions stem in large part from brainwashing of the public mind by Hollywood. Our “video culture” conveys “a tremendous amount of misinformation” about police operations and behavior, he says. “The extent to which the public relies on what they see on TV and in the movies,” often without being fully aware of it, “makes it very difficult for people to evaluate whether an officer has behaved appropriately in a use-of-force application.”

MYTH-BUSTING. The bulk of the video, then focuses on myths about OISs, phrased in the form of naive but potentially inflammatory questions that Kletzok and Gardner say frequently arise from the media and community activists after offenders are shot by police.

Here’s an abridged sampling. In some cases, the online video includes real-life dash-cam footage to help illustrate the problems discussed.

“Why didn’t the police talk the aggressor down?”

Most of the time, officers do talk people down, using their communication and persuasion skills, Artwohl points out. Research shows that “only about 1% of all calls for service result in any use of force, and only a very small percentage of those result in use of deadly force….

“Not all offenders can be talked out of what they’re getting ready to do. At that point, the only thing an officer can do is use force to protect his life and protect the public.”

Sometimes because of chemical, emotional, or other issues, subjects are “unable to listen to anything,” Lewinski adds. “That means they are in control of the situation. The officer is the reactor and has to respond to what the person is doing.

“It’s not the officer’s choice, usually, to avoid using verbal skills. It’s the person being unable to listen or attend or being unwilling to do what the officer is saying….”

“It was just a knife and the officer had a gun. Why didn’t the officer just disarm the subject?”

“Some people think an individual armed with a knife is not a dangerous threat to an officer,” Lewinski says. “From our research and the research of others, we know that not to be true. Knives can actually be more dangerous than a gun….

Force Science studies show that “a young person in reasonably good shape can cover as much as 31 feet in the time it takes an officer to draw his gun, point, and fire 1 round. If a person is 7 feet away, the officer could even have his gun in the low-ready position, and by the time he raises the gun and fires even once, he could be stabbed.

“A stab from a knife or a stab and upward cut can be extremely quick. Each cut or slash can occur at less than one-quarter second, and any one could be lethal for the officer….”

“Why not shoot the gun or knife out of their hand? Why not shoot to wound the subject? “

Lewinski recalls TV and movie westerns in which the hero defeats an attacker with this kind of precision shooting. “It’s one of those Hollywood myths,” he says. “It looks good on film but doesn’t work in the real world. Officers do not have the ability to fire and hit that accurately in a dynamic encounter.”

Even if officers aim for center mass, they “tend not to be as accurate as they might be on the range because the dynamics by which people move in a real-world encounter are such that center mass is a constantly changing target….”

To stop the threat, the goal of police deadly force, “the best place an officer can aim for is center mass,” Lewinski explains. “Even then it’s not a guarantee,” but it’s more realistic than the extraordinary challenge of intentionally hitting only an arm or a leg.

“Why were they shot in the back?”

In framing an answer to this nettlesome question, Lewinski describes a shooting in which he served as an expert witness. When the officer made the decision to shoot, the threatening suspect was facing him full-on. Yet when the smoke cleared, the officer’s rounds were found to have struck in the suspect’s side and back, making it appear that the officer had not been in jeopardy when he fired.

“By the time I can say ’1,000-and,’ the officer had fired 4 rounds,” discharging a bullet every quarter-second, “shooting to save his life,” Lewinski says. In that eye-blink, the suspect had begun to turn away, a movement the officer would not have had time to detect and react to. Inevitably, the subject’s side and back were exposed in the process to the line of fire.

“Very true, shots did go into the back,” Lewinski says. But in the time span involved, “there was nothing the officer could have done to stop from shooting the subject in the back.” In the video, Lewinski demonstrates the twisting-and-turning movement involved.

“Doesn’t a video of an event tell the whole story?”

In a word, No. A video camera, Lewinski explains, records action “from a particular perspective,” and that’s “very limiting in its ability” to tell the full story. “Look at the number of cameras necessary for referees to look at during a football game” in attempting to “accurately and completely” judge an action under scrutiny, he says.

In a video recording, which “people tend to think is an accurate reporter of any particular incident,” some action may be missing entirely, and what’s shown can be significantly skewed. Lewinski references a camera some officers now wear that sits just in front of an officer’s ear.

“This reportedly has the view of the officer, but it does not. If you close your left eye, for instance, you will see what your right eye sees. Your right eye sees a different field of view than your left eye. Now imagine a camera far behind your right eye. What does that see? No camera records things as an officer’s eyes and brain record it.”

OIS PROCEDURES. After the myth-busting segments, which also include reaction-time realities and less-lethal devices, the video concentrates on a walk-through of investigative procedures, given by Gardner and Gilbert. Among other things, they explain how the deadly force investigative team operates and why investigations sometimes take months to complete.

Gilbert expresses empathy “with the public and media being frustrated because a lot of information isn’t released immediately. It’s frustrating for the police, too. We want to get the story out, especially when an officer has done something heroic. But we need to wait so as not to taint the investigation.”

Artwohl notes in conclusion, “Most officers will tell you that by far the most stressful part of the event is what happens afterwards. We need to refrain from a rush to judgment. The least we can do is provide officers the benefit of the doubt while the investigation is going on.”

COPIES AVAILABLE. Public feedback on the video has been “very positive,” Gardner says, “but where we’ll get the most is on the heels of the next shooting.” Meanwhile, he and Kletzok encourage other policing agencies to benefit from the production, which Gardner describes as “a lasting tool to help educate people who are unfamiliar with law enforcement use of deadly force and how it is investigated. Officers deserve that community understanding. They’ve earned it.”

Kletzok agrees. The video, with its expert observations on the subtleties of OISs, can be accessible “for years to come, whenever questions come up about shootings,” she says. “At times when an agency might be unable to comment directly on a lethal force event, the video can speak for the agency about controversial or misunderstood issues.”

If you’d like a copy in DVD format, contact Gardner at: alex.gardner@co.lane.or.us and reference Force Science News.

For a complimentary subscription to Force Science News, an e-newsletter provided free by the Force Science Institute, visit www.forcescience.org or e-mail your contact information to: editor@forcescience.org

Regardless of what job you have, you always need to make sure that you have the right equipment for the job at hand. After over a decade working in the Law Enforcement community, I am still surprised that most of us do not have the tools necessary for the job that faces us every day. These tools can be either abstract tools or concrete tools (no, not the cement type…).

Lets start off with the abstract tools. How many people do you know that do not know the policies and procedures of your agency the way that they should? Exactly my point. When we do not know the policies and/or procedures of the agency that we work for, we are setting ourselves up for failure. Crash and Burn. Unemployment line. This is probably the single most important thing that we need to know about our jobs.

What do you think is the only thing that is going to save you when you find yourself in court? Policy and Procedure. If you know and follow them, you can never go wrong. Ever…EVER. Your supervisor may tell you that they will back you up when they make the wrong interpretation of the written word (policy/procedure), but when the rubber meets the road, they are going to go into cover their rear-end mode and let you flap in the wind because “you should have known better.” I know that it sounds cruel, but we have all seen it happen. Know your policies by heart.

Now to the concrete tools. What do you think you need to perform your job effectively? Well, that depends on the job, does it not? Working on the road as a Police Officer is relatively simple, equipment wise. Most agencies pretty much provides you with everything that you need: Weapon, duty gear, radio, vehicle (whether take home or not), baton, handcuffs, OC, Taser or whatever else they want you to carry. If they do not provide it, they tell you “this is what you need to get” and you buy it yourself (sucks but some agencies do this). The officers working in corrections are not that lucky. They get trained, clothed, and then told have at it as they are given keys to a cellblock full of offenders. They may be provided with OC and handcuffs but for the most part, that is it.

Most officers have to buy their own duty gear (handcuff case, OC case, flashlight, flashlight holder, baton holder, Kevlar gloves, etc) with very little guidance on what they may carry. They are only told what they may not carry. This is not one of those things that is the same across the country (most police agencies have the same gear/requirements) even though there should be some guidelines.

Look at the job that you do and then ask yourself “What do I need to do my job in the most effective way possible?” After you have asked that question, look for the answer in your policies, procedures, rules or regulations. And if you can’t find it, ask someone. Don’t find yourself under equipped for the task at hand. Tools are tools but knowledge is power…

Bryan Avila started working as a Police Officer in 1994 while attending Norwich University in Northfield, VT. In 1999 he began working for the Vermont Dept of Corrections while still working as a Part-Time Police Officer. In 2007 he left public service until 2009 when he began working for the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. He is currently a Correctional Training Instructor- Sergeant of Correctional Officers, at the TDCJ Region III Training Academy located in Rosharon, TX.

Ed. Note:  Bryan owns the Dydrostorm web store and is a sponsor of the Blue Crew.  He offers a substantial discount and free shipping to qualified orders made by Blue Crew members.

About an hour later, we had an armed robbery call. A K9 perimeter was set and my dog guys responded to the scene.

A black male had robbed a victim at gunpoint and fled on foot. Before the canine even came out of the car, a second armed robbery was reported six blocks north. Same suspect, same description.

K9′s moved to that location. The outer units sat tight. From two blocks away from where I was, a perimeter car radioed that a white male with a gun was approaching his car!

I hit the gas. I arrived to see the officer at low ready with a man in the middle of the street.

As it turns out, the armed white male was a robbery victim who had taken the gun from his black male assailant and chased him off. The clearly shaken victim saw a nearby police car and decided to tell the officer what had happened.

His mistake was to bring the bad guy’s handgun right up to the officer’s car. Luckily, the officer was a 20 year veteran with officer safety and common sense. Caution ruled over panic and we quickly deescalated the situation.

It is a fine line that we tread between officer safety and paranoia. It can’t be helped. Our rules of engagement are severely restricted by what is known at the time. Our rules of restriction are much greater by policy and litigation.

We face an enemy who perfectly blend in with those who would threaten, but not harm, any of us. Can you tell the difference? I can’t.

My Readoff mantra is, “Trust no one.” I stand by this. The sociopath will kill you, with a smile, while you think he is reaching for his ID. It has happened to men I know.

Unfortunately, the resolve to survive has to be balanced with keen situational awareness by today’s law enforcement officer. Those who can’t find that balance face either death or prosecution in a harsh legal environment. The people who would judge us do so from the safety of their chosen lives.

Think we earn our pay? I do. And a lot more.

Randall is a twenty-four year sworn police officer in a mid-sized Florida police department.  He has been an FTO, K9 Handler, Detective, and SWAT Team Leader.  He is currently the K9 Unit Sergeant and department SWAT Coordinator.

While it is true that most of us do not have the time to sit there and practice our response to a scenario 1000 times, nothing says that we can’t think about what are response will be when we are faced with a situation. Think about the amount of time that we have to think throughout the course of our day: in the shower, cooking (or waiting for our order at the drive thru), waiting in line, driving (not so safe but we still do it anyway), in the bathroom…

We have the time to think about what are response will be to any situation that we can come up with. Most of us will never be Bruce Lee so we can forget anything that is going to involve a lot of complicated moves unless we have the time to physically practice. The Inverted-U Hypothesis states, in a nutshell, that as our stress levels (arousal) increase, our fine motor skill will decrease and is therefore detrimental to our performance. What do we have left then? Gross motor skills.

If we repeatedly practice just a few simple responses to situations that do not involve fine motor skills, our performance during times of increased stress will improve thereby increasing our chances of survival. This also applies to our mental exercises. If we repeatedly think about the same adequate response to a certain situation, eventually you will not have to think about “what will I do,” you will just do. Just remember the KISS principle: Keep It Simple, Stupid.

When it takes an average person 1.5 seconds to close a 21′ gap, do you really have 1.5 seconds to think about what you will do as a response and take action? Guess how long it takes that average person to see something, recognize it as a threat, formulate a response and put it into action? Yep, 1.5 seconds.

I know I don’t have the time to think about it. Do you really do?

I want to know what you think!

Bryan Avila started working as a Police Officer in 1994 while attending Norwich University in Northfield, VT. In 1999 he began working for the Vermont Dept of Corrections while still working as a Part-Time Police Officer. In 2007 he left public service until 2009 when he began working for the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. He is currently a Correctional Training Instructor- Sergeant of Correctional Officers, at the TDCJ Region I Training Academy located in Huntsville, TX. And yes, he did marry again…

Ed. Note:  Bryan owns the Dydrostorm web store and is a sponsor of the Blue Crew.  He offers a substantial discount and free shipping to qualified orders made by Blue Crew members.

Photo courtesy of Tripp.

The Force Science research team that explored officer exhaustion through a unique set of experiments in Canada last September has now issued its official findings–first presented in detail in the Force Science Certification Course conducted in Wisconsin this past week (4/18-4/22) and scheduled for integration into future courses–with these significant conclusions:

• Less than 60 seconds of all-out exertion, such as an officer might expend in trying to control a combative offender, can deplete the average LEO’s physical reserves and put his life in peril;
• Environmental awareness and memory are also affected adversely, hampering an involved officer’s ability to deliver accurate, detailed statements and testimony once a desperate fight is over;
• Even officers in top condition are not immune to the rapid drain of physical prowess and cognitive faculties resulting from sustained hand-to-hand combat.

“The bottom line,” says Dr. Bill Lewinski, executive director of the Force Science Institute who headed up the research team, “is this: If an officer can’t resolve a struggle very quickly, a tactical withdrawal or swift escalation to a higher level of force may be necessary and justified for personal survival. And investigators and courts need to understand that an officer who doesn’t provide details surrounding a major physical conflict is not necessarily being deceptive, malicious, or uncooperative.”

TEST DESIGN. Force Science News explained the testing sequence of this research in Transmission #159 [9/24/10] soon after the project launched (click here to read it.) To recap:

Researchers recruited 52 officer volunteers (42 males, 10 females), ranging in age from 23 to 51, with an average of 8 years on the job. All were “familiar with officer safety training involving high aerobic physical engagement,” according to Dave Blocksidge, a Force Science Analyst from the London (England) Metropolitan Police, and one of the research team.

“During an initial briefing, all the subjects were told to remain alert and try to absorb and remember as much as they could about what took place,” Lewinski says.

First they were given a crime report to read, which included details about the m.o. and descriptions of an armed robbery crew that had attacked 3 locations. Then in a gym used for training by the Winnipeg (Manitoba) Police Service, the officers were paired, with one-half instructed one at a time to launch a full-force physical attack on a 300-lb. hanging water bag and the others (a control group) assigned as “partners” to observe as the action took place. All were fitted with heart-rate monitors and the “physical exerters” also donned VO2 masks to measure oxygen consumption and gas exchange.

The exerters were told to attack the bag with as much ferocity as they could muster, selecting their own “assault movements”–punches, kicks, and/or palm, elbow, and knee strikes. During the attack, a researcher shouted “encouragement” (“Harder! Faster!”) on 3 occasions. Once the name of a familiar intersection in Winnipeg was yelled out and another time a random 3-digit number was hollered. Unknown to the participants, all this would prove relevant later in a memory test.

The exerters were to sustain assailing the bag until they no longer had strength to keep going or until they were visibly maxed out (“breathless and struggling to continue”) and were told to stop by exercise physiologist Justin Dixon of the London Police, who supervised this part of the experiment.

“In terms of upper-body involvement and energy expended, the bag drill realistically replicated a full-force fight by a moderately trained officer to control a strong, dynamically resisting suspect,” Lewinski explains. “Two officers actually collapsed, and the rest were severely taxed as they moved on to the next phase of the test.”

That required the exerter to run upstairs and outside to a trailer that a “known felon” was suspected of occupying, a distance of 145 feet. En route, the officer passed a gaudily dressed role-player holding an electric drill, who stared at the exerter intently but said nothing and made no aggressive moves.

Inside the trailer, the officer found a “living room” mocked up with furniture and a variety of visible weapons, including an M16 carbine, a revolver, a sawed-off shotgun, and a large kitchen knife. After a 5-second delay, a “critical target” emerged from another room–”a large, black, middle-aged male,” wearing a black t- shirt, blue jeans, and a black bandana. He screamed profanities at the officer, commanding him/her to get out. He was not armed, although several of the weapons were within his easy reach.

The trailer scenario lasted about 15 seconds. After that, the exerter was permitted some “recovery time” while his observer partner ran through the same trailer exercise.
After 3 minutes’ rest, Dixon drew a blood sample from each participant to measure lactic acid levels. The officers were also given informational “updates” about the robbery crew.
Then all completed a battery of memory tests administered by Dr. Lorraine Hope, a cognitive psychologist from England’s University of Portsmouth. This testing included a review of what exerters and observers could remember about what had happened and a photo lineup in which the officers were asked to pick out the suspect they’d confronted in the trailer.

PHYSICAL DECLINE. The heart monitors, face masks, and blood tests all confirmed that exerters reached an intense level of energy output during the bag blitz. Heart rates, for example, leaped from an average resting rate of 73 bpm to an average maximum of 179 for the bag beaters, significantly higher than the modest average rise to 104 bpm for the observers. The exerters’ blood lactate levels, reflecting the amount of exertion and affecting muscle function, skyrocketed up to 13 times the normal resting concentration. “It was impressive how committed these officers were to going flat out,” Lewinski remarks.

Most dramatic–and alarming–was the speed at which exerters depleted their physical resources. On average, the officers spent 56 seconds hitting the bag, although some either quit or were called out as thoroughly exhausted after as little as 25 seconds. The blows they were able to deliver ranged from a low of 73 to a high of 274. The average was 183. The overwhelming majority of hits were fist punches.

Reviewing time-coded video of the action, researchers were able to count second by second the number of times each participant struck the bag. The average officer peaked at 15 seconds. After that, the frequency of strikes fell in a sharp and steady decline.

“The officers started out strong, driving hard with penetrating hits that visibly moved the heavy bag,” Lewinski reports. “But by 30 to 40 seconds, most were significantly weakened. They were not able to breathe properly, their cadence dropped, their strikes scarcely moved the bag if at all, and they were resorting largely to very weak, slowly paced blows that would have had little impact on a combative assailant.”

In effect, Blocksidge states in a paper he has written about the research, the exerters “delivering a concerted and sustained physical assault…’punched themselves out’ ” in a matter of seconds.

Perhaps surprisingly, this seemed true even of officers with a high level of personal fitness and fighting skill. Blocksidge offers this explanation: “Fitter officers delivered faster and more powerful strikes,” expending greater effort and thus exhausting their presumably greater reserves in “roughly the same time” as those less fit and skilled.

MEMORY DEFICIT. The officers’ exertion proved, for the most part, closely associated with incomplete and faulty memories of what they experienced. The exerters remembered “less visual and auditory information” and made “greater errors in recall” compared to the observing control group, Blocksidge reports.

Exerters and observers were asked to estimate within 90% the number of each type of blow delivered against the heavy bag. Exerters scored significantly better than observers in recalling the number of elbow, knee, and palm strikes they’d made. 89% of exerters, for example, estimated within the accepted accuracy range the number of elbow hits, compared to only 45% of observers.
“However, there were very few elbow, knee, and palm strikes made overall, so they tended to stand out in the exerters’ memory,” Lewinski explains. “But with the most common hits–punches–it was a far different story.” 25% fewer exerters than observers were able to estimate accurately the number of fist blows. “The more exhausted officers were, the less accurate their estimates tended to be,” notes researcher Hope.

Observers also were able to recall more by wide margins than exerters about the information that was shouted out during the bag blitz. Likewise, they were more accurate and more detailed in remembering information about the robbery crew.

As to the man with the drill who was encountered en route to the trailer, more than 90% of observers were able to recall at least one descriptive item about him, whereas nearly one-third of exerters did not remember seeing him at all.

Everyone remembered seeing the angry male in the trailer, but observers were able to correctly describe significantly more things about him, while making an average of half as many errors. And during the photo lineup, 54% of the observers correctly identified the suspect, compared to only 27% of the exerters. Typically, the tired officers expressed little certainty about the identifications they did make.

“As exhaustion takes over, cognitive resources tend to diminish,” Lewinski explains. “The ability to fully shift attention is inhibited, so even some potentially relevant information tends to get screened out. Ultimately, memory is determined by where the focus of attention was during an event. The exerters were zeroed in on delivering blows during the bag blitz. Afterward, they typically had little cognitive resources left.”

During the trailer encounter, however, the exerters were able to register threat cues. Here, in fact, their responses were virtually identical to those of observers. Six observers and 5 exerters remembered seeing no weapons at all. The most weapons noticed were 2, recalled by 4 observers and 5 exerters. However, 16 officers in each category remembered seeing one weapon, usually the largest (the carbine). (After noticing one, the researchers speculate, most officers may simply have quit scanning for more, having confirmed a potential life threat.)

“Fear conditioning through training,” Blocksidge writes, apparently “enables simple processing” of threat and danger cues to continue on some level “despite the impact of exhaustion and anxiety.” The ability to respond effectively to such cues, however, would be gravely degraded in an exhausted state, Lewinski points out.

IMPLICATIONS. As Lorraine Hope notes, “The legal system puts a great deal of emphasis on witness accounts, particularly those of professional witnesses like police officers.” After a violent confrontation, Blocksidge states, “it is commonly believed” that officers are capable of recalling relevant particulars, “such as subject position, number of blows, time sequences, verbal comments, and the position of colleagues…. Policing is quite unique within the cognitive field, since officers are [expected] to operate in a dual-task mode of…taking action whilst remembering…information.”

The gap documented by the study between what exerters and observers were able to remember means that in real-world conflicts “substantial aspects of visual details may remain [unnoticed] by active or involved witnesses while being noticed and attended by passive witnesses,” Blocksidge writes.

“If investigators and force reviewers don’t understand the implications of this study,” Lewinski cautions, “an officer’s memory errors or omissions after an intense physical struggle may unjustly affect his or her credibility. We think we have a lot of attentional resources working for us at all times, but in reality we don’t.”

In addition to illuminating memory issues, Lewinski is hopeful that the research findings will underscore the importance of tactical pre-assessment in deciding whether to engage or temporarily back off from potential physical conflict. “Officers need to read situations better before getting physically involved, knowing they have a limited capacity for all-out exertion,” he says.
When a struggle does occur, he hopes the findings will help officers, trainers, investigators, and reviewers better appreciate the justification in desperate circumstances for escalating force in order to end a dangerous fight quickly. “The longer physical combat lasts,” he explains, “the more at risk an officer is to the dire consequences of exhaustion. Very quickly an officer can reach the point of not having the energy or the ability to physically overcome resistance. Even a few seconds may make a difference between getting a suspect under control or the officer ending up badly hurt or killed.”

Sgt. Jason Anderson of Winnipeg Police Service’s Safety Unit, who assisted with the experiments, expresses gratitude for the study. He says it provides “data we can bring to court from a scientific organization using scientific methods and give the court the ability to properly assess these situations fairly.”

Statistical details from the study, which was funded fully by the Force Science Institute, will be included in a report the research team is preparing for publication in a peer-reviewed professional journal.

Meanwhile, footage shot by a Canadian Discovery Channel film crew is available for viewing, if you want to see how the experiments were conducted. Click here to see that footage and to read additional news reports on the study.

For a complimentary subscription to Force Science News, an e-newsletter provided free by the Force Science Institute, visit www.forcescience.org or e-mail your contact information to: editor@forcescience.org

The online Spanish lessons do not require registration and the classes are free.  It is self-directed training, meaning you can start and stop at any time.  This works well for police training, as most officers do not work 9-5 and are self-directed anyway.

A drawback to the class is the technology running the program is old and may not work on some machines.  Even though the lessons are web-based (html), the stated requirements of the course are old versions of Microsoft Windows (it makes no mention of Vista or Windows 7).  Mac OS, iOS, Android, Linux, etc are not officially supported.

I tried running the course on a Mac and an iPhone, but none of the audio would work.  Instead of using platform-neutral software, the audio appears to require Windows Media Player to play the audio.

It would be nice if the NIJ would update the program so that all of us can use the software.  With more agencies exploring the use of iPads and Android tablets in the field, the paradigm is shifting and the NIJ needs to catch up.

If you have a Windows machine, though, give the course a try.  It is free and you can do it in your spare time.

Here’s what then happened in the next few seconds:

Look at how fast this suspect attacked the officer with the knife:

05:01:55 – The officer stops his patrol car and shifts into park.

05:00:00 – The suspect exits his car.

05:00:02 – The suspect is slashes the officer in the face with a butcher knife.

If you’ve never seen a perfect example of the Tueller Drill, you now have.  Dennis Teuller was a police officer with the Salt Lake City PD, and he did a number of experiments regarding distance and reaction time.

The classic Teuller Drill essentially demonstrated a subject standing 21′ away from an officer can close the distance and stab an officer in about 1.5 seconds.  The average officer can probably draw his firearm and fire one shot in about the same amount of time.

The distance between the officer attacked and the suspect when he exited the car?  About 22′.

I know there are some people who might think the officers waited too long to start shooting the suspect.  Technically, the criticism would be correct insomuch as deadly force was justified prior to the actual use of deadly force.  However, reaction time isn’t an easy thing to calculate when under stress and in bad lighting conditions.

Reaction Time and Stress

In a reaction time study I reported on here, under ideal conditions, a police officer who knew he was going to be attacked with deadly force (no decision making involved), had a reaction time from threat to first shot of 0.39 seconds.  Keep in mind that is under ideal conditions:  lighting, weather and full knowledge of the threat.

In anything less than ideal conditions, reaction time will become longer.  Officers who are in body alarm response (aka “fight or flight”) suffer from various vision and cognitive effects, meaning reaction time can be slowed as the officers try to see what is in the suspect’s hand and form a proper response to the threat.

Lighting Conditions

As I reported in the article Visual Perception in Low Light, under non-threatening/non-stressful conditions well rested recruits had a great deal of difficulty in identifying known threats in low light.  In low light conditions, objects in the hand are very difficult to identify with any certainty.  In the dynamic conditions of a violent encounter, threat identification becomes vastly more difficult.

The shooting happened at about 5 am.  It was dark out with mainly lights from the patrol cars illuminating the scene.  The white light from the patrol cars were pointed in various directions, though at least one officer pointed his spotlight on the driver’s door (good job!)

The strobe effect of the emergency lights on the cars can also hinder the ability of officers to clearly identify an object or action.

The lighting conditions on the scene may have been enough alone to slow the officers reaction time simply because they were not able to instantly identify the knife.

Lessons:

• An end of the pursuit is not the end of the incident.
• Deadly attacks happen extremely fast.
• Distance is time and safety.
• Never give up.

Ultimately, the officer was injured and the suspect was killed.  The suspect was shot seven times and died at the hospital.  The shooting was ruled as a justified homicide.

Stay safe!

(A full, unedited copy of the video is available for download in the Blue Crew membership area.)

When I first got into police work, there was limited information on what the levels of protection were and how they translated into real world encounters.  Much of what I learned then was from the marketing information produced by various vest manufacturers.  We all know that marketing information is completely truthful and unbiased, right?

Fortunately, information about body armor is much easier to find.  The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) sets the standards for body armor in the United States, and they put together this video that explains all of the basics of body armor.

There are also some compelling stories told by officers who were saved by body armor.  Listening to them talk about their incidents should be enough to get anyone’s attention on how quickly things can go very bad.

Watch the video, wear your body armor and stay safe!

Photo courtesy of Tim Pearce

One of the most crucial aspects of working in a correctional facility is the search for contraband. We all know that it is there. But where is it? The hunt for contraband is just like a game of cat and mouse. Offenders have it and they don’t want us to find it. We want it and don’t want offenders to have it. So how do we find it? By getting down and dirty.

One thing that we must always keep in mind is that offenders are going to hide the contraband in the most disgusting places they can think of: inside the toilet, in trash, dirty and soiled clothing, and any other place that would make a normal person say “I am not going to put my hand in there!”

I never ceases to amaze me how many officers forget where to look. Before we even start working for corrections we already know how to shakedown a cell or a common area. We just didn’t realize that we knew. Think about all the places that you hid things from your siblings, parents, and spouses (gifts, etc) that you did not want them to find. The next thing that surprises me is that officers don’t use the proper gear when searching.

Think about gloves for a minute. What good is a pair of non-latex gloves going to do for you if you come across a needle or razorblade? The only thing that those gloves are good for is not getting your hands too dirty. Make sure you get a good pair of tactical Kevlar gloves. There are many brands out there and the small expense is worth it’s weight in gold if you never get injured. You can always put on the non-latex gloves over them for searching toilets and other disgusting things. DO NOT LET THEM WIN!

When searching an area, always use the same pattern that you have for yourself. Start at one end and work your way around. It does not matter if you go left to right or right to left; top to bottom or bottom to top. ALWAYS USE THE SAME PATTERN. This will avoid any confusion on what is left to do if you have to stop for any reason.

DO NOT forget food items! They love to hide contraband in containers and then make them look like they have never been opened. They are really good at doing this. Use spoons or tongue depressors to search things like peanut butter or fluids. Do not look with big things in mind (cell phone, weapons, etc). Instead, look for the smallest things that you can think of. If you search in this manner, you will find the big things as well as the small things.

Make sure that you crawl under beds, over beds and move things around. If it comes apart, take it apart and look in it. If it looks strange, take it! You can always give it back later if you have to. Do not take the shortcuts that a lot of officers like to take.

A few things to keep in mind:

1. Where would I hide it?
2. Am I satisfied with the job that I did?
3. Do I know my agencies policies and procedures to know what they can have?
4. Do I know what they can purchase from commissary?

If you can answer those questions honestly to yourself and are satisfied with the answer, you will be in great shape.

And most importantly, BE SAFE!

Bryan Avila started working as a Police Officer in 1994 while attending Norwich University in Northfield, VT. In 1999 he began working for the Vermont Dept of Corrections while still working as a Part-Time Police Officer. In 2007 he left public service until 2009 when he began working for the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. He is currently a Correctional Training Instructor- Sergeant of Correctional Officers, at the TDCJ Region I Training Academy located in Huntsville, TX. And yes, he did marry again…

Ed. Note:  Bryan owns the Dydrostorm web store and is a sponsor of the Blue Crew.  He offers a substantial discount and free shipping to qualified orders made by Blue Crew members.